Using A share listed companies in 2016—2020, we investigate the mechanism of the impact of annual report regulatory inquiries on auditors’pricing decisions. The results show that annual report regulatory inquiries raise audit fees by increasing the credibility and threat level of non controlling majority shareholders’exit threats, i. e., non controlling majority shareholders exit threats play a mediating effect. In terms of the characteristics of the inquiry letters, the more frequently the inquiries are asked and the more detailed the company’ responses are, the more significant the mediating effect of the exit threat of non controlling majority shareholders is. Further, from the perspective of internal and external monitoring, the mediating effect of non controlling shareholder exit threat is more significant in listed companies that choose firms without industry expertise and those with low board independence. The extended study finds that the increase in audit fees is due to the purchase of high quality audit services and not due to audit opinion purchase. The above results enrich the study of the economic consequences of annual report regulatory inquiries at the corporate governance level and expand the research related to the exit threat of non controlling majority shareholders and audit fees.