Net profit after deducting extraordinary items has gradually become a common indicator to measure whether the performance compensation commitment is fulfilled. Based on the data of backdoor listed companies with performance commitment agreements signed from 2009 to 2019, this paper tests the impact of performance compensation commitment with net profit after deducting extraordinary items as commitment clause on classified change earnings management. The results show that the earnings management level of the target enterprises in the commitment period is significantly higher than that after the end of the commitment period, in which the performance completion rate of the target enterprise has an inverted U shaped relationship with classified transfer earnings management, and the executive resource control ability plays a positive regulatory role; Further research shows that the target enterprise can raise the company’s core performance level by classified transfer of earnings management during the commitment period; with net profit after deducting extraordinary items as commitment, there is a substitution effect between real earnings management and classification shifting earnings management in the commitment period. The research results of this paper not only expand the related research of performance compensation commitment and earnings management, but also provide policy reference for regulators to regulate the performance commitment behavior in M&A.