This paper takes fiscal decentralization and social capital into the scope of rural public service supply, focusing on the moderating effect of different dimensions of social capital on rural public service satisfaction under the background of Chinese style decentralization. Stackelberg game model based on Chinese style decentralization confirms people’s livelihood expenditure preference has a high welfare effect on villagers. Social capital not only has a positive spillover channel for providers, but also significantly improves villagers’ welfare. The empirical analysis using CGSS data shows that: considering the financial difficulties faced by county level governments, loose financial constraints actually inhibit the improvement of rural public service satisfaction, while social capital, as the substitute of formal system, significantly promotes the villagers’ satisfaction of public services. However, we still need to be aware of the negative moderating effect of over dense network embedding. The above conclusion is proved to be effective and credible by cluster estimation and robustness test, which provides a useful reference for correcting the bias of rural public goods supply and making up for the shortcomings of rural public service in the new era.