From the perspective of internal governance of the executive team, when non CEO executives have stronger independence from the CEO, they can play a “bottom up” role in checking and balancing the misconduct of the CEO. Based on the perspective of an external monitor of accounting information, this paper examines the governance effects of non CEO executive independence by examining accounting firms’ responses to the independence of non CEO executives of their clients. It is found that higher non CEO executive independence is associated with lower audit pricing by accounting firms. Mechanistic tests indicate that the above results are mainly due to a decrease in the risk of misstatement of corporate financial statements and operational risk. In addition, when non CEO executives have greater discipline, non CEO executive independence has a more effective governance effect, which in turn reduces firm audit pricing; this relationship is particularly pronounced in firms with less effective board oversight and “non big 10”. Further research shows that non CEO executive independence increases the probability of receiving a standard unqualified opinion; and even if the audit pricing is reduced, the audit quality does not decline. The findings of this study provide an important basis for clarifying the governance mechanism of non CEO executive independence, and have implications for listed companies to optimize their management structure and firms audit decisions.