In a Chinese reverse merger(RM), the auditor of an RM firm (unlisted firm) can be the incumbent auditor of shell firm (listed firm) or a new auditor. Using data from RMs that make performance commitments during the period of 2011-2020, we examine the impact of auditor choice on performance commitments achievement. We find that RM firms hiring new auditors in RMs are more likely to accurately achieve performance commitments than RM firms retaining the incumbent auditors of shell firms. Further analysis shows that income-increasing accruals is the mechanism for precise achievement of performance commitments by RM firms with choosing new auditors in RMs. In addition, the positive effect of choosing new auditor in RMs and precise achievement of performance commitments is more pronounced when the performance commitment compensation is in the form of share-based compensation and when the parties of the RMs are related parties. Moreover, RM firms exhibit drops in accounting and stock return performance after the expiration of performance commitments, and large shareholders of such companies are more likely to reduce their holdings at the end of the lock-up period when new auditors are appointed in RMs. Overall, our results indicate that RM firms hiring a new auditor in RMs are more opportunistic than RM firms retaining the incumbent auditors of shell firms.