上市公司审计委员会与年报风险信息披露——基于管理层信息操纵视角
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国家自然科学基金面上项目(72172061);江苏2023年度高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目(2023SJYB0343);2023年江苏省研究生科研创新计划(KYCX23_2336)


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    摘要:

    上市公司年报风险信息是了解公司经营现状与预测未来发展的重要信息来源,它具有信息增量价值,但容易受到管理层信息操纵的影响。审计委员会作为公司治理的独立机制,对管理层具有内部监督作用。基于此,利用2010—2021年上市公司风险信息披露数据,实证检验了审计委员会对管理层信息操纵的治理作用。研究发现,审计委员会独立性、勤勉性和专业性越强,年报风险信息披露水平越高,且在不同性质市场环境中审计委员会的治理作用存在差异。机制检验结果表明,内部控制发挥了部分中介作用;此外,在内部治理环境较弱与外部监督压力较大时,审计委员会的治理作用更加显著。结论拓展了年报风险信息披露的影响因素研究,并通过构建不同维度的风险信息指标来综合衡量披露水平,证实了审计委员会对管理层信息操纵的治理效应,为审计委员会更好发挥监督效果以及监管部门进一步完善上市公司风险信息披露制度提供了重要支撑。

    Abstract:

    The annual report risk information of listed companies is an important source of information for understanding the current operating status and predicting future development of the company. It has information increment value, but is easily influenced by management information manipulation. The audit committee, as an independent mechanism of corporate governance, has an internal supervisory role over the management. Based on this, this article uses the risk information disclosure data of listed companies from 2010 to 2021 to empirically test the governance effect of audit committees on management information manipulation. Research has found that the stronger independence, diligence, and professionalism of audit committees, the higher the level of risk information disclosure in annual reports, and there are differences in the governance role of audit committees in different market environments. The mechanism test results indicate that internal control has played a partial mediating role; in addition, the governance role of the audit committee is more significant when the internal governance environment is weak and external supervision pressure is high. The conclusion of the article expands the research on the influencing factors of risk information disclosure in annual reports, and comprehensively measures the level of disclosure by constructing risk information indicators of different dimensions, confirming the governance effect of audit committees on management information manipulation, providing important support for regulatory authorities to further improve the risk information disclosure system of listed companies.

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池国华a,苍正伟b.上市公司审计委员会与年报风险信息披露——基于管理层信息操纵视角[J].审计与经济研究,2024,(3):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-04-27
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