This paper takes the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies, and tests the influence of interlocked directors on the audit fees and the action mechanism of listed companies based on the busy hypothesis and collusion hypothesis. Research found that the interlocked directors increases the audit fees of listed companies, and the breadth and depth of the interlocked directors can significantly increase the audit fees of listed companies. The inspection of the influence mechanism found that the interlocked directors aggravated the financial risk of listed companies, and then increased the audit fees of listed companies. Further research shows that the positive impact of interlocked directors on audit fees of listed companies is more stronger in the internal director interlocked, non-state-owned enterprises, institutional investors hold a high shareholding ratio and listed companies have major defects in internal control. The relevant conclusions further enrich the theoretical research in the field of interlocking director tenure and audit fees, and can also provide references for accounting firms to optimize audit pricing decisions and listed companies to improve corporate governance system.