共同机构所有权能抑制“言过其实”的数字化披露吗?
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国家社会科学基金一般项目(21BTJ001);中央高校基本科研业务费项目人文社科振兴项目(2021SRY04)


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    摘要:

    企业的数字化披露是利益相关者了解其数字化行动的主要途径,然而,在缺乏披露标准和有效监督的情况下,企业有机会通过夸大数字化程度来迎合资本市场偏好。鉴于此,选取2008—2021年A股上市公司样本,研究共同机构所有权对数字化过度披露的影响。研究发现:共同机构所有权能有效抑制企业“言过其实”的数字化披露行为;机制检验表明,共同机构所有权可发挥竞争缓解效应及协同治理效应,从而减少企业对数字化的过度披露;异质性分析表明,只有长期共同机构持股才能够抑制数字化的过度披露,且共同机构所有权仅对所在地市场化程度较低、税负和财务负担较小企业的数字化过度披露行为产生抑制作用。结论丰富了数字化和企业信息操纵领域的研究,并为当前如何看待共同机构持股行为提供了新的分析视角。

    Abstract:

    Digital disclosure is the main way for stakeholders to understand a companys digital actions. However, in the absence of disclosure standards and effective supervision, companies have the opportunity to exaggerate the degree of digitalization to cater to capital market preferences. Hence, taking the samples of A Share listed companies from 2008 to 2021, this paper examines the impact of common institutional ownership on the overdisclosure of digital information. Research has found that common institutional ownership can effectively curb companies exaggerated digital disclosure behavior. The mechanism test shows that common institutional ownership can exert the effect of competition mitigation and collaborative governance, and reduce the excessive digital disclosure by enterprises. Heterogeneity analysis shows that only longterm common institutional ownership can suppress digital over disclosure, and common institutional ownership only has an inhibitory effect on digital over disclosure behavior of enterprises with lower marketization in their location and enterprises with lower tax and financial burdens. The study enriches the field of digitalization and enterprise information manipulation and provides a new analytical perspective on the behavior of common institutional ownership.

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孙凤娥.共同机构所有权能抑制“言过其实”的数字化披露吗?[J].审计与经济研究,2024,(6):

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-11-05
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