Based on the matched data of performance commitment fulfillment and stock exchange inquiries from 2014 to 2022, this study examines the regulatory effectiveness of stock exchange inquiries on M&A performance commitments. The findings reveal that while the stock exchanges inquiries on M&A performance commitments have not yet achieved effective supervision, inquiries into previous performance commitment events can still serve as an intertemporal risk warning for current performance commitments. Furthermore, external markets can receive risk warning signals from stock exchange inquiry letters, with a more negative market reaction to the first announcement date of current M&A events when there are more inquiries about previous performance commitments. Additionally, the introduction of directors and officers liability insurance, engagement of highreputation financial advisors, and strengthening of regulatory policies can work in synergy with stock exchange inquiry letters to achieve effective supervision of performance commitments, as evidenced by improved completion rates of current performance commitments and reduced likelihood of performance deterioration after the commitment period.