The default of bonds has changed investors risk awareness, thereby increasing the demand for accounting information and auditing. Research has found that after the increase in investors auditing demand, investors pay more attention to audit reputation, which is manifested by a significant increase in bond financing costs for issuers audited by accounting firms with damaged reputations; issuers pay more attention to audit reputation, which is manifested by the fact that accounting firms with damaged reputations are more likely to be replaced. When investors face higher bond investment risks, the increase in bond financing costs caused by damaged audit reputation is more significant; when bond financing is more important to the issuer, the replacement of accounting firms caused by damaged reputation is more significant. In addition, after the increase in investors auditing demands, the quality of financial reports, a product jointly supplied by issuers and auditors, significantly improves, and this effect is more significant among issuers who previously employed firms with damaged reputations. These results indicate that after the increase in investors audit demand, both investors and issuers pay significantly more attention to audit reputation, which in turn promotes the continuous supply of highquality audit services and the improvement of the information environment in capital markets.