Data assets are an important foundation for the formation of new quality productivity, but their information disclosure mechanism is not yet sound, which has raised the requirements for audit services due to the complex problems it has caused. This article explores the impact of data asset information disclosure on auditor selection. Research has found that disclosure of data asset information increases the probability of companies hiring high-quality auditors. Mechanism testing shows that the first type of agency cost, the second type of agency cost, and media attention play a mediating role, supporting agency motivation and signal transmission motivation, but insurance theory motivation is not supported. Heterogeneity testing shows that when companies are in data intensive, nontraditional manufacturing industries, or when there are changes in accounting firms, shorter terms, or lower industry expertise, their demand for high-quality audit services is higher. In addition, highquality auditors will pay more attention to the disclosure of data asset information in key audit matters and strengthen the positive relationship between data asset information disclosure and enterprise value. This article enriches the research on the economic consequences of data asset information disclosure from the perspective of auditors, and also provides incremental contributions to explaining the motivation for hiring highquality auditors.