隐性债务风险控制与公司权益资本成本——基于杠杆操纵视角
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国家自然科学基金面上项目(70242001;72272005);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72202008)


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    摘要:

    隐性债务风险是影响资本市场稳定运行与高质量发展的严重隐患,杠杆操纵作为企业规避监管要求或满足融资条件而调整账面杠杆水平以隐藏真实负债状况的常见手段,是隐性债务风险形成与积聚的重要来源。本文以2007—2022年我国A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,基于杠杆操纵视角,实证考察隐性债务风险对公司权益资本成本的影响及作用机制。研究发现,公司杠杆操纵程度越高,权益资本成本越高,表明隐性债务风险的积聚会显著影响资本市场定价。进一步研究发现,杠杆操纵对公司权益资本成本的作用机制主要为信息渠道,即杠杆操纵会降低信息透明度和加剧信息不对称,且该影响在违约风险较低、成长性较好以及被出具标准无保留审计意见的公司中更为显著。经济后果研究发现,杠杆操纵所引致的公司权益资本成本上升会进一步降低企业投资效率和劳动收入份额。研究结论可以为强化上市公司会计监管、提升信息披露质量、推动中长期资金入市及促进经济高质量发展提供经验证据与决策参考。

    Abstract:

    Leverage manipulation is a common practice employed by firms to circumvent regulation and windowdress their financial conditions. The resultant accumulation of hidden debt risk has become a significant threat to the stable operation and highquality development of capital markets. Using a sample of nonfinancial listed companies of Ashare in China from 2007 to 2022, this paper empirically examines the impact of leverage manipulation on the cost of equity capital and its underlying mechanisms. The findings indicate that a higher degree of leverage manipulation is associated with a higher cost of equity. Mechanism analysis reveals that leverage manipulation drives up the risk premium demanded by investors by reducing information transparency and exacerbating information asymmetry. Heterogeneity analysis shows that this effect is more pronounced among firms with lower default risk, higher growth potential, and those receiving standard unqualified opinions. Further analysis demonstrates that greater leverage manipulation is associated with lower investment efficiency and a smaller labor income share, aggravating factor allocation imbalances and eroding the material foundation of common prosperity at the micro level. This study can provide empirical evidence and decisionmaking references for strengthening accounting supervision of listed companies, improving the quality of information disclosure, promoting the entry of mediumand longterm funds into the market, and facilitating highquality economic development.

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陈祎丽 陆正飞 许晓芳.隐性债务风险控制与公司权益资本成本——基于杠杆操纵视角[J].审计与经济研究,2026,41(3):1-11

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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-06-11
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