Against the institutional backdrop of the new Company Law of PRC strengthening the oversight responsibilities of audit committees, how to proactively address information disadvantages and enhance supervisory effectiveness under the practical constraints of incomplete alignment between institutional empowerment and information provision has become a significant research topic. Research findings indicate that audit committee members attendance at shareholder meetings—an informationdriven proactive duty fulfillment behavior—effectively enhances their oversight capabilities and curbs corporate earnings management. This effect is more pronounced when internal information access is constrained, external information noise is high, and shareholder meeting information density is substantial. This governance effect stems from incremental information gained through the broad participation of ordinary members. Furthermore, the study systematically examines the governance boundaries between “presence” and “active engagement” based on onsite participation levels. It highlights the reinforcing role of interactive participation in information acquisition processes for enhancing oversight effectiveness, reveals the information governance mechanisms within audit committee operations, underscores the unique informational value of shareholder meetings in compensating for deficiencies in conventional information channels, and provides empirical evidence for institutional refinement.