出资人责任追究与国有企业高质量发展——基于经营投资问责制度实施的准自然实验
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国家自然科学基金重点项目(72532004);教育部人文社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(22JZD007);暨南大学博士研究生拔尖创新人才培养项目(2024CXB015)


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    摘要:

    在生产力驱动的新发展格局下,经营投资问责制度作为一种重要的外部问责机制,考察其如何影响国有企业生产经营行为,对于推动国有企业高质量发展具有重要意义。以2013—2023年沪深A股上市企业为研究样本,从高质量发展视角考察了经营投资问责制度的溢出效应。研究发现,经营投资问责制度能够显著促进国有企业高质量发展,表现为提高国有企业的全要素生产率。机制检验发现,经营投资问责制度通过增加高质量创新产出、强化内部控制质量、加强投资决策稳健性以及提高投资效率来促进国有企业全要素生产率提升。异质性检验发现,经营投资问责制度的政策效果在社会性负担较大、处于成长期和成熟期、党组织治理程度较低以及地区法律环境较薄弱的国有企业中更显著。运用大语言模型构造的新指标进行经济后果分析发现,经营投资问责制度还能够显著提升企业的市场话语权。研究结论证实了经营投资问责制度的积极成效,从高质量发展视角丰富了问责制度的相关研究,为完善中国特色国有资产监督管理体系提供政策建议。

    Abstract:

    Under the context of productivity-oriented development, this study investigates whether the accountability system for business and investment activities, as an external governance mechanism, can improve the operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using a sample of A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2023, we examine the impact of this accountability system on SOEs' high-quality development. The results show that the implementation of the accountability system significantly enhances SOEs' high-quality development, as reflected by higher total factor productivity. Further analyses reveal that the accountability system improves productivity by promoting high-quality innovation, strengthening internal control, enhancing investment decision-making prudence, and improving investment efficiency. The effects are more pronounced among SOEs with heavier social burdens, those in the growth or mature stages, firms with weaker Party organization governance, and firms located in regions with less developed legal environments. In addition, based on novel measures constructed with large language models, we find that the accountability system also strengthens firms'market power. Overall, this study highlights the economic consequences of accountability-based governance and extends research on institutional constraints and SOE development. The findings also offer implications for improving the supervision framework of state-owned assets in China.

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张振堃,黎文靖.出资人责任追究与国有企业高质量发展——基于经营投资问责制度实施的准自然实验[J].审计与经济研究,2026,41(5):117-127

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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-09-10
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