陈效东.管理层股权激励与审计监督:利益权衡还是信号传递?[J].审计与经济研究,2017,(4):
管理层股权激励与审计监督:利益权衡还是信号传递?
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  股权激励  审计费用  内部控制  激励型股权激励  非激励型股权激励  审计风险  审计质量  盈余管理
英文关键词:executives equity incentives  audit fees  internal controls  incentive motivation  non incentive motivation  audit risks  audit quality  earnings management
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究基金一般项目(16YJC630009);浙江省自然科学基金青年项目(LQ17G020005);浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题一般项目(16NDJC151YB)
作者单位
陈效东 浙江财经大学 会计学院浙江 杭州 310018 
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中文摘要:
      以独立的第三方审计监督为视角,选取2006—2014年A股非金融类上市公司为样本,检验高管人员股权激励与审计费用之间的关系。研究发现,股权激励能显著降低公司的审计费用,并且这种降低主要是通过提高公司的内部控制水平来实现的。进一步区分股权激励的动机后研究发现,管理层股权激励通过提高公司内部控制水平降低审计费用的行为可能与上市公司实施的基于激励型动机的股权激励有关。上述研究表明,审计人员可能根据被审计单位的内部控制水平来识别管理层股权激励的动机,进而寻求不同的审计收费补偿,这样所传递的信号有助于投资者更加准确地识别管理层股权激励的动机。
英文摘要:
      Focus on the independent part of the audit supervision,this paper investigates the relationship between executives equity incentives and audit fees by selecting the non financial listed companies of A share from 2006 to 2014.We argue that equity incentives not only can significantly reduce audit fees,but also this reduction is mainly through the improvement the level of internal controls.After distinguishing between the motivations of equity incentive,we found the executives equity incentives reduced audit fees through improving the level of internal controls,which may be related to the incentive motivation of equity incentives.These results show that auditors may identify the motivation of executives equity incentives based on the levels of internal control to seek different audit fees compensation.The signals that are delivered by auditors can help investors identify the motivation of the executives equity incentives more accurately.
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