Using a sample of M&A events of listed firms from 2007 to 2017，this paper analyzes if shared auditors between the acquirer firm and the target firm can affect M&A goodwill bubbles and further explores the specific channel and path.It arrives at the conclusions as follows：the shared auditors between the acquirer firm and the target firm significantly reduced the amount of new-acquisition goodwill，and after the completion of the M&A，it significantly reduced the probability of impairment of the goodwill and the proportion of the impairment of goodwill.By further exploring the mechanism of shared auditors on the M&A goodwill bubbles，we find that shared auditors can significantly inhibit the accrued earnings management behavior of the acquirer.At the same time，the results of the group test show that the inhibitory effect of shared auditors on the merger M&A goodwill bubbles is mainly established in the context of high information asymmetry，indicating that the above effect is achieved by reducing information asymmetry.