李璐,姚海鑫.共享审计能抑制并购商誉饱沫吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2019,(5):
共享审计能抑制并购商誉饱沫吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  共享审计  并购商誉  商誉减值  信息不对称  盈余管理  财务报告审计  审计质量  审计意见
英文关键词:shared auditors  M&A goodwill  goodwill impairment  information asymmetry  earnings management  financial reporting audit  audit quality  audit opinion
基金项目:
作者单位
李璐,姚海鑫 辽宁大学 商学院辽宁 沈阳110036 
摘要点击次数: 166
全文下载次数: 323
中文摘要:
      以2007—2017年我国上市公司并购事件为样本,考察共享审计对并购商誉泡沫的影响及作用机理。研究发现:并购双方共享审计显著降低了新增并购商誉金额,且在并购完成后,显著降低了并购商誉发生减值的概率以及商誉减值的计提比例。进一步探究作用机理发现,共享审计能够显著抑制并购方的应计盈余管理行为。同时,分组检验结果显示,共享审计对并购商誉泡沫的抑制作用主要在信息不对称程度较高的情境下成立,表明上述作用是通过降低信息不对称得以实现的。
英文摘要:
      Using a sample of M&A events of listed firms from 2007 to 2017,this paper analyzes if shared auditors between the acquirer firm and the target firm can affect M&A goodwill bubbles and further explores the specific channel and path.It arrives at the conclusions as follows:the shared auditors between the acquirer firm and the target firm significantly reduced the amount of new-acquisition goodwill,and after the completion of the M&A,it significantly reduced the probability of impairment of the goodwill and the proportion of the impairment of goodwill.By further exploring the mechanism of shared auditors on the M&A goodwill bubbles,we find that shared auditors can significantly inhibit the accrued earnings management behavior of the acquirer.At the same time,the results of the group test show that the inhibitory effect of shared auditors on the merger M&A goodwill bubbles is mainly established in the context of high information asymmetry,indicating that the above effect is achieved by reducing information asymmetry.
查看全文  
关闭