胡才龙1,2,魏建国1.多任务委托代理模型下地方政府债务管理激励契约设计——基于省级面板数据的实证检验[J].审计与经济研究,2019,(5):
多任务委托代理模型下地方政府债务管理激励契约设计——基于省级面板数据的实证检验
  
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中文关键词:  地方政府债务  激励契约  多任务委托代理模型  财政信息披露  税收努力
英文关键词:local governments’debt  incentive contract  multi-task principal-agent model  financial information disclosure  tax efforts
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作者单位
胡才龙1,2,魏建国1 1.武汉理工大学 经济学院湖北 武汉4300702.湖北省社会科学院 财贸研究所湖北 武汉430077 
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中文摘要:
      地方政府债务风险是区域性和系统性金融风险的重要隐患,妥善化解存量地方政府债务风险成为打赢金融风险攻坚战的着力点。运用多任务委托代理模型分析“中央-地方政府”间的地方政府债务管理过程与机理,并采用2009—2016年省级面板数据对由激励契约提出的假设条件进行实证检验,研究发现:(1)中央政府制定赋予地方政府财政收入自主权的“事前”激励手段有助于地方政府努力管理债务;(2)中央政府依据地方政府财政信息披露和税收努力程度两种观测信息设计“事前”激励契约是有效的;(3)中央政府对地方政府债务管理努力水平的激励是“临界型激励契约”,且中央政府的激励水平与地方政府努力水平存在帕累托最优均衡点;(4)中央政府对地方政府管理显性和隐性债务努力活动的“事前”激励大小取决于两种活动努力成本间的关系。
英文摘要:
      Local debt risk is an important hidden danger of regional and systemic financial risk,therefore,properly dissolving local debt risks has become the focus of reducing the financial risks.This paper uses the multi-task principal-agent model to explore the process and mechanism of local debt management in“central-local government”,and uses the 2009-2016 provincial panel data to empirically test the hypothetical conditions proposed by the incentive contract conclusion.The results show that:(1)The“ex ante”incentives set by the central government to give local government fiscal revenue autonomy can effectively boost local governments’efforts to manage debt risks.(2)Designing“ex-ante”incentive contracts based on local government fiscal information disclosure and tax effort is effective.(3)The incentives for the effort level of local governments managing debt are“critical incentive contract”and the incentives and efforts between them have Pareto optimal equilibrium condition,and(4)The degree of“ex ante”incentives of the central government for local governments to make efforts to manage explicit and implicit debt depends on the relationship of efforts’cost between the two activities.
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