张庆君a,b,黄 玲a,申 思a.控股股东股权质押对企业违约风险具有缓释效应吗?——来自我国违规上市公司的证据[J].审计与经济研究,2021,(3):
控股股东股权质押对企业违约风险具有缓释效应吗?——来自我国违规上市公司的证据
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  股权质押  违约风险  控制权转移风险  公司治理  股价崩盘  企业规模
英文关键词:share pledge  default risk  transfer of control risk  corporate governance  share price crash  company size
基金项目:国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(20FJYB003)
作者单位
张庆君a,b,黄 玲a,申 思a 天津财经大学 a.金融学院b.金融与保险研究中心天津 300222 
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中文摘要:
      控股股东股权质押在为企业融资的同时,也会对企业的经营活动产生影响。选取2013—2018年A股非金融类违规上市企业作为样本,研究违规企业控股股东股权质押对企业违约风险的影响,结果表明:控股股东股权质押与企业违约风险之间存在非线性关系,即股权质押与违约概率之间存在着U型关系,股权质押比例增加在期初会降低违约风险,但当质押比例达到某一阈值之后,继续提高股权质押比例则会增加违约风险。进一步研究发现,当控制权转移风险与公司治理水平较高时,控股股东股权质押与企业违约风险之间的非线性关系依然存在。
英文摘要:
      The pledge of the controlling shareholder’s equity will affect the business activities of the enterprise while financing for the enterprise. Based on 2013—2018 A-share non-financial violations of listed companies as research samples,we study the influence of controlling shareholders’share pledge on enterprise’s default risk. It is found that there is a nonlinear relationship between the share pledge of the controlling shareholder and the risk of default. Specifically, there is a U-shaped relationship between share pledge and default probability. It is to say that share pledge will first reduce the risk of default,and further increasing share pledge, which will increase the risk of default after the proportion of pledge reaches a certain threshold. Further research shows that when the risk of control transfer and the level of corporate governance is high, there is a non-linear relationship between the pledge of controlling shareholders’equity and the risk of corporate default.
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